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Outsourcing Decisions – the Case of Parallel Production 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract  
Purpose – This paper aims to investigate an underexplored aspect of outsourcing involving a mixed 
strategy in which parallel production is continued in-house at the same time as outsourcing occurs. 
Design/methodology/approach – The study applied a multiple case study approach and drew on 
qualitative data collected through in-depth interviews with wood product manufacturing companies. 
Findings – The paper posits that there should be a variety of mixed strategies between the two 
governance forms of “make” or “buy.” In order to address how companies should consider the extent to 
which they outsource, the analysis was structured around two ends of a continuum: in-house dominance 
or outsourcing dominance. With an in-house-dominant strategy, outsourcing complements an 
organization’s own production to optimize capacity utilization and outsource less cost-efficient 
production, or is used as a tool to learn how to outsource. With an outsourcing-dominant strategy, in-
house production helps maintain complementary competencies and avoids lock-in risk. 
Research limitations/implications – This paper takes initial steps toward an exploration of different 
mixed strategies. Additional research is required to understand the costs of different mixed strategies 
compared with insourcing and outsourcing, and to study parallel production from a supplier viewpoint.  
Practical implications – This paper suggests that managers should think twice before rushing to a “me 
too” outsourcing strategy in which in-house capacities are completely closed. It is important to take a 
dynamic view of outsourcing that maintains a mixed strategy as an option, particularly in situations that 
involve an underdeveloped supplier market and/or as a way to develop resources over the long term. 
Originality/ value – The concept of combining both “make” and “buy” is not new. However, little if 
any research has focused explicitly on exploring the variety of different types of mixed strategies that 
exist on the continuum between insourcing and outsourcing. 
Keywords - Outsourcing, insourcing, mixed strategy, parallel production, taper integration, concurrent 
sourcing 
Paper type Research paper 
  
 
Introduction 
The concept of combining “make and buy” by keeping some capacity under internal 
governance instead of fully closing in-house production is not new. For example, Porter 
(1980) and Harrigan (1984; 1986) addressed the topic when debating vertical integration 
under the label of “taper integration.” The mixed strategy option was also researched to some 
extent in the “make or buy” literature during the 1980s (e.g., Leenders and Nollet, 1984; 
Bradach and Eccles, 1989). This topic has again attracted academic interest from a 
governance perspective with regard to the debate on the blurring of firm boundaries under 
different labels: permeable vertical architectures (Jakobides and Billinger, 2006), concurrent 
sourcing strategies (Parmigiani, 2007; Parmigiani and Mitchell, 2009; Mols, 2010b), and 
plural sourcing/governance (Heide, 2003; Puranam et al., 2008). Mixed strategies were also 
addressed as an operational planning subject in which models were developed to understand 
capacity and supply chain flexibility by using parallel production lines or multiple distribution 
channels (e.g., Kamien and Li, 1990; de Kok, 2000; Ferdows et al., 2004; Yang et al., 2005; 
Boulaksil and Fransoo, 2010; Fredriksson et al., 2010).  
Therefore, the topic of mixed strategies inspired early research and more recently received 
renewed academic interest. The concurrent sourcing literature is centered on theoretical 
explanations concerning the drivers for mixed strategies (Parmigiani, 2007; Puranam et al., 
2008; Parmigiani and Mitchell, 2009; Mols, 2010a), and theories such as agency theory, 
transaction cost economics (TCE), resource-based theory (RBT), and extended resource-based 
theory (ERBT) are used as theoretical explanations for the occurrence of concurrent sourcing. 
The outsourcing literature based on TCE and RBT/ERBT is often – either implicitly or 
explicitly – concerned with a company’s decision to strike a balance between insourcing and 
outsourcing of its total operations (e.g., Quinn, 2000; McIvor 2009). Although the extant 
literature focused on these issues, it has also noted the need for further research (see, e.g., 
Rothaermel et al., 2006; Puranam et al., 2008; Harland et al., 2005; Mols, 2010a). Drawing 
on Leenders and Nollet (1984), the degree to which companies should consider outsourcing of 
individual components could be structured around two ends of a continuum, which Leenders 
and Nollet referred to as “major doers” and “major buyers”, respectively (see Figure 1):  In-house dominance with complementary outsourcing (“major doers”) and  Outsourcing dominance with complementary in-house activities (“major buyers”). 
In this view, the extent to which a company uses external resources is situated on the 
continuum ranging from in-house dominance to outsourcing dominance. Therefore, the level 
of parallel production is contingent on the different drivers in each specific case, which also 
ranges on this continuum (see Figure 1). 
 
Insert Figure 1 here. 
 
Although the mixed strategy stream of literature in general addresses different drivers 
from Leenders and Nollet (1984) specifically, it provides little guidance for how companies 
should think about how much to outsource for a specific component related to different 
driving forces (cf. Harland et al., 2005, p. 843). Some exceptions are capacity flexibility, 
which is often referred to as keeping the majority of production in-house and outsourcing 
during demand peaks (e.g., de Kok, 2000; Yang et al., 2005), and withholding bargaining 
power position by keeping a small part of the production in-house (e.g., Dutta et al., 1995; 
  
Heide, 2003; Jacobides and Billinger, 2006). However, few studies have focused explicitly on 
exploring the varieties of mixed strategies that exist on the continuum between insourcing and 
outsourcing of individual components or resources. To address this issue, the present paper 
aims to develop a model that populates the continuum between in-house production and 
outsourcing, using different types of mixed strategies, with a particular focus on the situation 
in which parallel production is continued along with a certain degree of outsourcing of a 
specific component or resource. This effort, which extends the work of Leenders and Nollet 
(1984), particularly focuses on identifying different types of mixed strategies situated between 
“major doers” and “major buyers.” The core of the paper is a series of cases studies on the 
Scandinavian wood product manufacturing (WPM) industry, which manufactures products 
such as floors, doors, and windows that add value to raw wood material. 
This paper makes a distinct contribution to the more general field of outsourcing research. 
Through the case studies, we suggest a continuum that shows the existence of different types 
of mixed strategies between make and buy. This work is an extension of the make-or-buy and 
concurrent sourcing literature, which has paid scant attention to illustrating the different types 
of mixed strategies between in-house production and outsourcing. Furthermore, the 
framework provides practitioners with an aide memoire when considering outsourcing in a 
non-developed supplier market and/or to develop resources over the long term. 
The next section of the paper conducts a literature review. We then present our research 
methodology, followed by the case descriptions in which we present and discuss five mixed 
strategies. Conclusions are drawn with implications for both theory and practice as well as for 
future research. 
Literature review 
The literature review is divided into three parts. First, theoretical approaches to 
outsourcing are reviewed to explain the manner in which mixed strategies are understood. 
Second, outsourcing decision frameworks are reviewed to describe how to make outsourcing 
decisions. Third, the review focuses on why and how organizations employ mixed strategies 
to build a mixed strategy framework.  
Theoretical underpinnings of outsourcing 
Anchored on the notion that outsourcing is more related to transfer than procurement 
(Gilley and Rasheed, 2000; Beaumont and Sohal, 2004; Sousa and Voss, 2007), the present 
paper defines outsourcing as the transference of an activity from internal governance to 
external control. A lot of outsourcing research has drawn on theoretical perspectives such as 
TCE or RBT/ERBT of the firm and adopted a strategic view of the outsourcing phenomena 
(McIvor, 2005; Boulaksil and Fransoo, 2010; Busi and McIvor, 2008). As Figure 2 shows, 
these theoretical underpinnings have two contrasting points of departure for outsourcing 
(Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2001; McIvor 2008). 
 
Insert Figure 2 here. 
 
TCE considers the firm not as a production function, but more as a governance structure 
(Williamson, 1979; 1985). TCE emphasizes minimizing both production and transaction costs 
by determining an appropriate governance structure (Williamson, 1979, p. 245; 1985; 2008). 
Williamson (1991; 2008) defined three ways of organizing transactions: market, hierarchy 
(i.e., handling the activity within the firm), or hybrid. The latter can be characterized by 
  
various forms of strategic alliance agreements between buyer and seller (Williamson, 1991). 
This setup is viewed more as a temporary contracting mode that will ultimately revert to 
either of the two polar modes (in other words, market and hierarchy) (Williamson, 2008). 
Transaction costs emerge when there is a need to allocate resources to organize transactions 
between parties (Johanson and Mattsson, 1987). TCE relies on two fundamental human 
behavioral assumptions that cause transaction difficulties: (1) bounded rationality, in which, at 
best, incomplete contracts are established; and (2) opportunism, which assumes that humans 
are self-interest seekers with guile, which is seldom transparent ex ante (Williamson, 1975, p. 
21; 1985; 1990, p. 12). The dimensions of the transaction also influences transaction costs, 
thereby affecting the choice of governance mode with assets that specifically have the greatest 
explanatory value (Williamson, 1991).  
From a RBT perspective, the firm is more than a portfolio of businesses and products; it is 
also a portfolio of competencies (Wernerfelt, 1984; Hamel and Heene, 1994; Long and 
Vickers-Koch, 1995; Javidan, 1998). RBT advocates that the firm should define its businesses 
on the strength of its own resources, with emphasis on leveraging the firm’s core 
competencies. Firms’ resources are fundamentally heterogeneous (Peteraf, 1993), and a 
competitive advantage arises from resources that are difficult for competitors to imitate 
(Barney, 1991; Grant, 1991). In outsourcing research based on RBT, the focus is on retaining 
in-house core activities that are essential for the competiveness of the firm, with non-core 
activities to be outsourced (McIvor, 2005). A number of academic papers have taken an RBT 
perspective to address outsourcing decisions (e.g., Venkatesan, 1992; Quinn and Hilmer, 
1994; Insinga and Werle, 2000; Gotfredson et al., 2005). 
Among other things, ERBT contends that although organizations require valuable, rare, 
inimitable, and non-substitutable resources to obtain a competitive advantage, these resources 
and capabilities can reside outside the boundaries of the firm. From this perspective, 
competitive advantage is achieved through “the interplay between organizations and their 
external environment” (Lewis et al., 2010, p. 1035). The focus here is on how supply chain 
linkages or inter-firm relationships provide access to strategic resources in order to provide a 
competitive advantage. From this perspective, therefore, the decision to outsource is not based 
on the logic of outsourcing non-core activities to focus on core activities to achieve a 
competitive advantage. Instead, the primary driver to outsourcing is to obtain access to 
resources that cannot be easily reproduced or substituted by competitors. These resources do 
not need to be owned (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; Lewis, 2000; Lewis et al., 2010).   
Other researchers have argued that transaction-based outsourcing logic is insufficient. 
Holcomb and Hitt (2007) extended TCE and RBT to explain the conditions leading to 
strategic outsourcing. Their paper, which built on previous research (see Poppo and Zenger, 
1998; Combs and Ketchen, 1999; Madhok, 2002; Jacobides and Winter, 2005; and Hoetker, 
2005), stated that when making a strategic outsourcing decision, it is necessary to look 
beyond just economizing circumstances, such as asset specificity and technological 
uncertainty, and to include a number of other important factors. They argued that four crucial 
conditions exist for strategic outsourcing: capabilities, strategic relatedness, relational 
capability-building mechanisms, and cooperative norms (Holcomb and Hitt, 2007, p. 465).  
Review of recent outsourcing decision frameworks 
Among the early examples of studies that applied TCE, Walker and Weber (1984) studied 
make or buy decisions for firms in the United States automobile industry with the help of 
TCE. In fact, TCE has been a dominant means of understanding the outsourcing decision over 
the last three decades (Espino-Rodrigez, et al., 2006; Holcomb and Hitt, 2007). Since the 
publication of Prahalad and Hamel’s (1990) influential article on core competence and with 
  
an increasing focus on the strategic level in outsourcing decisions, the RBT has received a 
more prominent position (McIvor, 2005; 2010). In the 2000s, various authors continued to 
develop different RBT-influenced frameworks to assist in the formulation of outsourcing 
strategies (see Cánez et al. (2000) or Boulaksil and Fransoo (2010) for an overview and 
review of these frameworks).  
From a single or mixed theoretical approach, the last decade has seen the development of 
a number of frameworks that address the outsourcing decision (e.g., Gottfredson et al., 2005; 
Aron and Singh, 2005; Baines et al., 2005; Holcomb and Hitt, 2007; Tate and Ellram, 2009; 
McIvor, 2008; 2009; 2010; 2011). Table 1 summarizes these frameworks.  
 
Insert Table 1 here. 
 
The approaches summarized in Table 1 emphasize the need to treat outsourcing as a 
strategic question with which to achieve the expected benefits; this concept was effectively 
highlighted in earlier RBT-influenced literature. For example, scholars such as Venkatesan 
(1992), Quinn and Hilmer (1994), and Ingsinga and Werle (2000) argued the need to link 
outsourcing to the overall strategy of the firm. Previous literature has focused more on the 
need for strategic linkages in order to avoid the risk of cost reductions and of outsourcing 
long-term critical activities. More recent literature has added a dimension of opportunism 
through which firms should think strategically to access specialized capabilities that are not 
available in-house (Holcomb and Hitt, 2007). 
Review of literature on mixed strategies 
Combining in-house production with outsourcing can be considered a plural form of 
governance that resides on the boundary between the firm and the supplier, where the firm is 
partially vertically integrated in order to make and buy the same goods (Bradach and Eccles, 
1989; Parmigiani, 2007; Parmigiani and Mitchell, 2009; Mols, 2010b; Aláez-Aller and 
Longás-García, 2010). Various studies have identified the existence of mixed strategies in a 
variety of industries, ranging from the fashion industry (Ferdows et al., 2004; Jacobides and 
Billinger, 2006) and franchising (Bradach and Eccles, 1989) to toy manufacturing (Mols, 
2010b), metal-working (Parmigiani, 2007; Fredriksson et al., 2010), and trucking (He and 
Nickerson, 2006). In fact, combining make and buy seems more common in practice than its 
occurrence in the literature would suggest (for examples, see Dutta et al., 1995; Rothaermel et 
al., 2006; Parmigiani, 2007; Puranam et al., 2008; Mols, 2010a). 
A mixed strategy contrasts with the classical view of hierarchy and markets (that is, in and 
out) being mutually exclusive governance forms (Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Dutta et al., 
1995; Herriot and Kulkarni, 2001). In the late 1980s, Bradach and Eccles (1989, p. 100) 
identified the lack of research on the plural governance form and stated that, “…by slavish 
adhering to markets and hierarches framework, ignores the obvious and fascinating issue of 
why companies so often both make and buy.” In contrast, a mixed strategy should not be 
considered an intermediate hybrid form (e.g., Williamson, 1991; 2008) because it does not 
refer to sourcing from a single source characterized by a mixed governance mode (for 
example, a temporary contracting mode such as strategic alliances), but more to dividing 
volume between multiple governance modes (Dutta et al., 1995; Puranam et al., 2008).  
Several studies have reviewed and related different theoretical underpinnings in order to 
create propositions and draw conclusions on why and how firms apply a mixed approach. 
Drawing on Mols (2010a; 2010b), Table 2 summarizes these propositions and conclusions, 
which are then addressed in detail below.  
  
 
Insert Table 2 here. 
 
Capacity flexibility 
A commonly argued driving force in the literature for mixed strategies is to help a firm 
balance its in-house manufacturing capacity through parallel production lines (e.g., Kamien 
and Li, 1990; Yang et al., 2005; de Kok, 2000) or multiple distribution channels (e.g., 
Ferdows et al., 2004; He and Nickerson, 2006; Fredriksson et al., 2010). The need for 
production flexibility is contingent on a number of factors, including demand fluctuations, 
degree of automation, and technological development (Johansen and Riis, 1995). Tactical use 
of an external source to balance in-house production is particularly helpful for firms facing 
constantly fluctuating demand (Harrigan, 1986; Yang et al., 2005) or partially uncontrollable 
in-house factors such as “workforce and machines” (Yang et al., 2005 p. 328). This type of 
mixed approach aims to create flexibility in the company’s own production units and ensure 
high utilization of the company’s own assets (He and Nickerson, 2006; Mols, 2010b). In this 
sense, a mixed strategy to achieve capacity flexibility is considered a production planning 
strategy of the firm (Kamien and Li, 1990).  
Core competence/capabilities  
A mixed approach can help to (1) develop innovation strategies (Veugelers and Cassiman, 
1990) and (2) increase product diversity by buying finished products instead of developing 
them internally (Rothaermel et al., 2006). With this starting point, the core 
competence/capability driver is a firm’s effort to capitalize on uneven distributed capabilities, 
and an external party infuses the focal firm with new ideas (Jacobides and Billing, 2006; 
Mols, 2010b), referred to by the literature as a ratcheting strategy (Bradach and Eccles, 1989, 
p. 113). Arguably, a mixed strategy enables the development of suppliers and knowledge 
transfer from in-house to external suppliers (Mols, 2010b). Parmigiani and Mitchell (2009) 
suggested that firms often need to keep manufacturing capability in-house to manage their 
outsourcing and found that firms with in-depth expertise still often apply a concurrent 
sourcing strategy that further helps augment its own knowledge. Such a mixed strategy 
enables external suppliers to be continuously benchmarked, possibly helping to develop the 
vendor’s ability to manage the taken-over outsourcing (cf. Zoran et al., 2012).  
Lock-in risk 
Complete outsourcing is often an irreversible strategy because the outsourcing company 
divests the capabilities it needs to perform the activity at a later stage (Lonsdale and Cox, 
1997; Harland et al., 2003; Dekkers, 2011). In this way, outsourcing increases supplier 
dependence (Walker, 1988; Lonsdale and Cox, 1997; Ellram and Billington, 2001). Such a 
lock-in risks shifting power to the supplier (Stuckey and White, 1993; Lonsdale and Cox, 
1997; Lonsdale, 2001; Cox et al., 2003). A mixed strategy could help withhold bargaining 
power and offer a safeguard when outsourcing (Harrigan, 1986; Mols, 2010a; 2010b; 
Puranam et al., 2008).  
Dutta et al. (1995) and Heide (2003, p. 26) posited that behavioral uncertainty and 
safeguarding problems in particular lead firms to deploy a plural governance form. Following 
this view, a mixed approach could be a particularly good option if the supplier market is 
malfunctioning to some degree or if a supply imbalance exists (cf. Walker et al., 2005) from, 
  
for instance, oligopolistic or monopolistic market structures (e.g., Scherer, 1971) or high 
degrees of asset specificity and opportunistic behavior in transactions between buyer and 
seller (Williamson, 1985). Given small parallel production, a firm may then avoid the unfair 
pricing (referred to in the make or buy literature as price appropriation; e.g., Walker and 
Weber, 1984) that a supplier uses to take advantage of the customer’s dependence and to 
increase its portion of end customer revenues (Dutta et al., 1995; Heide, 2003; Parmigiani, 
2007).  
Cost 
From a mixed strategy perspective, the cost of having both in-house production and an 
external supplier is often assumed to be higher than a single governance form when the firm 
also needs to invest in maintaining the internal organization (Mols, 2010b). This view holds 
that the driver related to costs is – in the mixed strategy literature – more linked to the 
perspective of performance uncertainty such that a mixed strategy creates cost transparency 
(Heide 2003; Mols, 2010b). Thus, by obtaining superior information on cost/prices, a mixed 
strategy enables a company to benchmark its in-house operations to external suppliers 
(Puranam et al., 2008). In general, companies increasingly focus on continuously analyzing 
their business processes to determine how competitive they are (Heywood, 2001). In such 
situations, outsourcing provides an opportunity to benchmark internal operations with external 
suppliers. Therefore, a mixed strategy can also provide clear benchmarks and performance 
goals for both the supplier and the outsourcing firm (Puranam et al., 2008).  
Summary 
The review identified several driving forces for a mixed strategy. Not unexpectedly, the 
major driving forces for a mixed strategy resemble the traditional drivers for outsourcing, 
including capacity flexibility, external capabilities, and core competence (see, e.g., McIvor, 
2005). These driving forces also link to some of the commonly argued outsourcing risks, such 
as lock-in risk, low irreversibility of outsourcing decision, and supplier performance 
uncertainty.  
Although the literature on mixed strategies addresses drivers similar to those in the 
literature on outsourcing, they can differ in nature. For example, the desire to achieve 
operational flexibility and manage capacity constraints is a commonly argued driving force in 
outsourcing research (e.g., Quinn and Hilmer, 1994; Harrison and Kelly, 1993; Hendry, 1995; 
Bragg, 1998; Fill and Visser, 2000; Cánez et al., 2000; Gilley and Rasheed, 2000). Although 
studies on mixed strategies and on outsourcing both view flexibility as an important driving 
force, the conclusions of the two research streams differ. In the outsourcing stream, the 
rationale is to create flexibility by giving a supplier this responsibility, assuming that a 
supplier market or individual suppliers have the ability to carry out the function being 
outsourced. In this view, the market and/or supplier have excess capacity, making them better 
able to arrange production flexibility more cost efficiently than the outsourcing party (McIvor, 
2005). In mixed strategy studies, adding capacity from an outside source creates flexibility, 
but the lion’s share of the production is kept in-house and is regarded as the more important 
production resource (Yang et al., 2005). 
With a starting point from the literature review and drawing on Leenders and Nollet 
(1984), a distinction seems to exist between companies that predominantly handle their own 
production – “in-house dominance” – and companies that are predominately outsourcing – 
“outsourcing dominance” (see Figure 3). 
 
  
Insert Figure 3 here. 
 
With an in-house dominance (“major doer”) outsourcing strategy, a mixed strategy is 
viewed in terms of what its stream of literature often refers to as volume/capacity flexibility 
(e.g., de Kok, 2000; Salvador et al., 2007; Jacobides and Billinger, 2006; Stevenson and 
Spring, 2009). Such complementary outsourcing allows output to be changed quickly to 
manage the demand uncertainty that exists in the market or to improve the efficiency of a 
company’s own in-house plant manufacturing. Such a strategy may also be viewed as a way 
to learn how to outsource by testing smaller volumes and then gradually increasing the 
outsourcing (Leenders and Nollet, 1984). Complementary in-house production (“major 
buyer”) shows that a mixed strategy refers more to what the literature calls keeping 
complementary manufacturing competencies to create cost transparency (e.g., Heywood, 
2001; Puranam et al., 2008) and avoid lock-in risk (e.g., Harrigan, 1986; Dutta et al., 1995).  
Research methodology 
This study applies a case study approach (Yin, 1989; 2003) to provide new perspectives to 
well researched areas (Eisenhardt, 1989; Bengtsson et al., 1997; Voss, 2002). Cases used in 
case studies should be selected on the basis of being interesting for theoretical and empirical 
reasons and not to achieve high representativity (Yin, 1989; Bengtsson et al., 1997, p. 477).  
The selection of case companies was based on a sector analysis of wood product 
manufacturers in Scandinavia (see Brege et al., 2004; Brege, 2009). The case companies were 
chosen from this sector based on dialogue with industry experts and the Invest in Sweden 
Agency (ISA)a. Of the 17 companies approached through experts and the ISA, five cases were 
identified as being suitable to study mixed strategies. The objective of selecting cases for this 
paper was to identify companies that had experiences different from mixed strategies in 
several sub-industries within the wood sector. 
This paper is based on data collected from 30 in-depth interviews with 14 management 
personnel directly involved in the outsourcing decision at the case study companies (see Table 
3). The interviewees for the cases were selected to obtain a clear overview of the respective 
company’s outsourcing strategy to determine multiple viewpoints (cf. Voss et al., 2002). Both 
the researchers as interviewers and company representatives identified the interviewees as 
being the most appropriate and best-informed individuals at each company.  
 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
The interviews were recorded and lasted for an average of one hour. Notes were also 
taken during the interviews and an interview guide was used for all sessions. To increase the 
validity of the study, several follow-up interviews were conducted (cf. Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 
2003; Voss et al., 2002). The results from the first round of interviews were fed into the 
second round, which was instrumental to increase construct validity (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 
2003). This process also made it possible to establish whether the interviewees agreed or 
disagreed with the initial findings. This research strategy provided us with a better 
                                                 
a
 The official investment promotion agency of Sweden, which helps international companies pursue business 
opportunities in Sweden. 
  
convergence of evidence because the data was collected during different occasions and was 
used as a quality check and created the opportunity to collect new information (Yin, 2003). 
Apart from these discrete interviews, data was collected through general meetings and mill 
visits to the case companies studied and their suppliers. Primary data collection was 
complemented by secondary data in the form of internal material and public annual reports. 
Standardization of the interviews was central to the data collection, and the interview guide 
helped increase reliability. Reliability was further improved through the following means: (a) 
asking interviewees at the initial meeting/telephone contact if they considered themselves the 
most suitable person to interview given the background described; (b) conducting the 
interviews at the interviewee’s office at a time suitable for the interviewee; and (c) taking an 
open-ended interview approach to capture different dimensions of interviewees’ views on 
outsourcing (Yin, 2003).  
The recorded interviews were transcribed into written form for further compilation, at 
which time information was organized into cases for pattern matching. The comprehensive 
case descriptions (each ranging from 10–20 pages) were sent to the case companies for 
verification, correction, and the addition of comments, which also helped increase the 
construct validity of the data collected (Yin 1989, Ellram 1996). The analysis used a 
replication logic approach (for example, drawing cross-case conclusions) and linked and 
mapped the data to theory (Yin, 2003). Using a replication logic approach makes it possible to 
determine that the findings are in line with previous studies and the contradictory issues 
(Bengtsson et al., 1997).  
Case studies of parallel production 
This section presents five case descriptions from the Scandinavian wood product 
manufacturing (WPM) sector that apply different mixed strategies. Most firms in the WPM 
sector started as joinery factories or sawmill-related companies, and many remained small, 
concentrating on serving local markets. The Swedish market is worth approximately €4–5 
billion and is diversified, with over 400 companies present. WPM firms are closely related 
and often have the same type of suppliers for their purchase of wood raw material: sawmill 
companies in the primary wood industry that supply the sawn wood. Over the years, the 
sawmill industry consolidated, resulting in larger and fewer operational units (top 10 Swedish 
sawmill producers hold approximately 60 percent of total production capacity); however, a 
long tail comprised of smaller, local sawmills still operates (in 2011, Sweden had more than 
140 active sawmills with capacity larger than 10,000 m3 per year). At the European level, the 
market is even more fragmented, with the top 25 producers representing less than 25 percent 
of total production capacity. 
The supplier and customer in the context studied apply different business logics. The 
WPM sector is a raw material-intensive industry in which the purchasing cost of raw wood 
material is a substantial part of WPM firms’ manufacturing costs. This characteristic makes 
sourcing an important issue and has a significant effect on the financial performance of the 
firm. Nonetheless, firms in the WPM sector did not work closely with suppliers from the 
primary wood industry, traditionally handled most manufacturing of wood components and 
parts in-house, and primarily bought standard or bulk delivery of sawn timber from the 
production output of multiple sawmills. This lack of confidence was mutual when suppliers to 
the primary wood industry stated that firms in the WPM sector insufficiently plan their raw 
material needs and often search the market for alternative suppliers offering lower prices. This 
problem resulted in arms-length customer–supplier relationships under standardized 
interfaces.  
  
Simultaneously, WPM firms often have difficulty obtaining the wood raw material with 
just the properties needed for their manufacturing. This difficulty is related to the fact that the 
primary wood industry sorts its output according to different properties and quality classes. 
Thus, adjusting to specific customer requirements is difficult when doing so results in 
consequential products that are challenging to offset in the market. Thus, the sawmill is 
somewhat restricted in its sawing to the “standard dimensions” of sawn timber that exists in 
the industry.  
Related to this issue is that sawmills’ production output is characterized by a divergent 
production flow and a high level of upstream uncertainty of input given the heterogeneity of 
wood. Therefore, every single piece of production input in the form of saw logs to sawmills 
can result in a number of various outputs to different possible customers; in other words, 
several possible products can be produced from the raw material input. Therefore, 
manufacturers of products that incorporate sawn timber products (for example, WPM firms) 
often procure only a portion of their production input of wood from each sawmill’s 
production and require multiple suppliers, which makes a single sourcing strategy more 
difficult to apply. The divergent production flow creates several consequent products and by-
products (for example, sawdust and wood chips) that sawmills also need to offset to assure 
profitability (fiber costs represent approximately 70 percent of a sawmill’s total costs). Thus, 
for suppliers from the primary wood industry, the question is not just selecting the most 
valuable customer and only focusing on the most profitable product output. In fact, 
traditionally, all of a sawmill’s production output (including by-products) needs to be sold to 
assure profitability. The focus is on economies of scale in sawmill production and ensuring a 
high yield between production input and output. Traditionally, WPM firms guarded 
themselves against supply uncertainty from the primary wood industry and their own 
deficiencies in planning by spot purchasing sawn timber from multiple suppliers and buffers, 
and engaged in in-house sawmill activities to process some of the raw material. 
The companies studied in this paper decided to keep parts of their production in-house but 
with different drivers. The strategies and motives of the five mixed strategies in our case 
studies are presented in a typology (see Table 4), which is further addressed in the following 
case descriptions.  
 
Insert Table 4 here. 
 
Case A – Outsourcing as a capacity regulator  
Company A is one of the largest producers of wooden windows in Europe. Approximately 
two-thirds of the group’s sales are related to the market for remodeling/renovation and 
residential extension projects. Remaining sales are from new housing construction. These 
end-user markets have highly cyclical demand patterns that are affected by factors such as the 
general state of the global economy, national GDP growth and interest rates, and consumer 
confidence in future market development, all of which affect the demand for windows. 
Demand for windows in the Nordic region also experiences significant seasonal fluctuations, 
with lower activity in the wintertime when weather conditions are less suitable for building 
and renovating houses (for example, variations of 20–40 percent often occur for single 
houses).  
Therefore, investing in large in-house production involves the risk of low-capacity 
utilization and high fixed costs during periods of lower demand. To manage these business 
cycles and the variations in seasonal demand, the group’s large-scale in-house production of 
  
window blanks – the key component used for producing the window frames – in its four own 
plants is complemented by outsourcing of up to 40 percent of the volume to one large external 
supplier. The group applies a similar logic to outsource window glass, outsources 30–40 
percent of its window glass production to two suppliers in Poland, and manufactures the 
majority of glass in-house. 
Although outsourcing the window blanks component results in cost advantages of 
approximately 10–20 percent, the group has no direct plan to increase outsourcing to further 
enhance capacity flexibility. The group deliberately decided to keep its main capacity and 
interweaved capabilities in-house. Window blanks are the first input to window production, 
and high supply reliability of components of sufficient quality is critical to avoid costly repair 
activities or factory production interruptions. Small changes in quality (approximately 0.5 
percent) are not a direct problem. However, a catastrophe may occur if quality deteriorates 
and the volume of blanks that need to be repaired doubles or triples. In fact, additional repair 
activities can become so expensive that it renders the cost reduction of the initial outsourcing 
to be quite small in comparison.  
Therefore, the group director considers the outsourcing of window blanks an important 
capacity regulator of the company’s own production. This outsourcing activity helps the 
company retain high capacity utilization of in-house assets despite variations in window 
demand. Outsourcing also provides the necessary production flexibility to assist the company 
in avoiding costly investments in capacity expansion that can result in overly large fixed costs 
during market downturns. As the CEO for company A explained: 
“…we can operate our machines optimally and have a steady year-round 
production volume” //“…we are currently in a situation that we could take 
a substantial downturn [on the market] without it affecting us.” (CEO) 
Case B – Outsourcing of non-cost competitive production  
Company B is one of the largest wood parquet flooring manufacturers in Europe. 
Historically, the company’s production strategy was organized to handle the entire value 
chain in-house, from the processing of raw wood materials to finished products, including 
integrated upstream processing of raw materials and even its own power plants. This strategy 
resulted in a very inflexible production process, resulting in the company being unable to 
mobilize its strength to exploit growth in market upswings. Therefore, Company B 
experienced overly high fixed costs during market downturns. In addition, the company is 
experiencing increased price pressure in a mature and fragmented market with more 
competition from producers in low-cost countries. To manage this situation, Company B 
underwent a turnaround and replaced its former integrated production strategy with a strategy 
focused on increasing flexibility (for example, enabling faster switchovers to new products) 
and finding the most efficient processing chain possible – either in-house production or 
outsourcing to suppliers. The new strategy prioritized downstream manufacturing activities, 
which allowed for differentiation and added value to customers.  
The company successfully outsourced some small-volume components (such as end-
pieces to the floor and some specific wear-layers) and one complete floor type. To truly 
enhance flexibility and improve production efficiency, management set a strategic goal to 
start outsourcing the mid-layer and bottom-layer (M/B-component) manufacturing of the floor 
– handled at three different locations – with five production lines. Manufacturing of M/B-
components is a large-scale operation with large material flows: Company B uses 
approximately 115,000 m3 of direct raw materials per year for M/B-components and produces 
approximately 450 m3 per day (or approximately 30,000 m2 M/B-components per day). 
Outsourcing this operation became more difficult than expected.  
  
The company’s goal was to reduce costs by 20 percent through outsourcing. However, 
Company B found no developed intermediary industry positioned between sawmilling and the 
company for such component manufacturing. Over several years, Company B’s management 
spent significant time and effort looking for suitable suppliers. As part of this endeavor, the 
company also conducted a larger investigation into better understanding the in-house cost 
levels and comparing them with both domestic and off-shore suppliers (Sweden, Estonia, 
Finland, Ukraine, and China). Because raw material costs constitute more than 50 percent of 
total costs, acquiring wood cheaply is critical. However, one problem is that the raw material 
has a similar price everywhere. 
The result of the endeavor showed that in-house production was very cost efficient and 
that no suppliers existed that had adequate scale and cost efficiency to take over the 
outsourcing. Therefore, Company B revised its formulated strategy to instead focus on 
outsourcing volumes of non-standard M/B components (non-standard width and length) that 
were primarily produced from its two less efficient production lines and M/B components 
produced during costly working shifts (reducing shifts from five to three). The CEO described 
the strategy: 
“One thing is that labor costs are higher during the last shifts. The other 
thing is that you lose production on other shifts if you manufacture during 
night and day. This is because you do not have time for maintenance. If you 
do need to do maintenance – say your machine breaks down or something 
like that [in other words, other operational disturbance] – you are forced to 
do that during normal uptime. If you have two shifts then you can do the 
maintenance during the night and if you have three shifts you can do it 
during weekends. The marginal volume you gain is decreasing the whole 
time.” (CEO) 
In this sense, Company B was able to outsource this production and keep most of the 
standard M/B component manufacturing in-house. Although the outsourcing was planned for 
a cost that was higher than the company’s own efficient production, the company still 
expected to realize savings from the improved efficiency of its own in-house plant 
manufacturing and by avoiding costly capital investments to upgrade less efficient production. 
The purchasing director stated that this strategy maintained the fixed costs for the present 
manufacturing and avoided new investments, allowing Company B to experience a more 
normal rate of machinery utilization in its main plant (that is, too many costly nights shifts 
were prevented).  
Case C – Outsourcing to improve the structure of given capacity  
Company C, a large supplier of wooden windows in the Nordic region, produces 
approximately 250,000 wood windows per year and manufactures approximately 60,000 
different types of windows. Traditionally, the company handled all of its production in-house 
in its main production plant, from sawn timber to complete wood windows. Company C 
experienced very strong revenue growth, driven by the booming housing sector in the Nordic 
countries that doubled its production volume of windows in just four years. The increased 
production volume resulted in space scarcity in the current production plant. Its location, in 
proximity to a city and surrounded by other manufacturers, means that little if any space is 
available for expansion at the current production location. In addition, Company C’s window 
production is characterized by a complex production flow and very short production series. 
For example, the type of window to be manufactured is decided during the first sawing of the 
timber. More than 150 components exist before the planing of wood; more than 1,000 
  
components exist after mill machining; and, after painting, the number of components again 
doubles several times. As the Managing Director for the company explained: 
“… we can also see that the production plant has increased its volume by 
almost 100 percent in four years. We have had enormous volume growth at 
the same time as we have increased the complexity by taking in new brands 
… the variety of different types [windows] has exploded.” (Managing 
Director) 
The company focused on outsourcing to achieve market and sales expansion without 
making new investments in an additional manufacturing facility. As one member of the sales 
management team stated: 
“The main overall driving force is the need for capacity.” (Member of sales 
management team) 
To reduce the complexity of the internal production flow and simultaneously free up space 
to further increase capacity, management implemented a multiple production line outsourcing 
strategy for the manufacture of windows and window blanks. The concept was that 
outsourcing parts of the production would enable the company to produce a wider range of 
different products; for example, the company would be able to concentrate specifically on 
certain customers, such as DIY retailers. Although these products already exist, the capacity 
and space limitations and the complex production flow made producing them in the present 
setup too complicated. Therefore, outsourcing enabled the production of these new windows. 
The space made available was intended for downstream activities that add differentiation and 
help decrease the complex material flow (for example, painting and other window surface 
treatment). 
Case D – Outsourcing to build own experience  
Company D develops and manufactures wood floors and distributes its products 
worldwide. The company has a long tradition of handling all activities in-house (even 
processing the raw wood material). However, from a customer viewpoint, full integration is 
not necessarily an advantage. In addition, competition from new, low-cost entrants and 
substitutes (laminate flooring), as well as a stagnant wooden flooring market, increased the 
company’s focus on production flexibility and outsourcing of non-core activities. The process 
manager and the R&D manager emphasized that the company’s core competencies 
increasingly became the following: (1) handling and coordinating flows (for example, from 
supply centers), (2) manufacturing activities at the end of the value chain, and (3) managing 
markets and customers. With this in mind, the company sees less of a need to keep all 
manufacturing in-house and seeks a production strategy that manages some production in-
house and outsources several products and components through by outsourcing agreements 
with external sources.  
Company D is at the beginning of a radical outsourcing program. Although the company 
clearly intends to start several outsourcing programs, one complicating factor is its limited 
outsourcing experience. Therefore, Company D prefers to start by “test outsourcing” certain 
volumes of M/B components to external suppliers to enable it to learn how outsourcing works 
and then gradually extend the effort. The company started to outsource the manufacture of 
some complete floors, which it expects to increase in the future after it gains more experience. 
Another area is the M/B component, which does not create enough market differentiation and, 
according to the R&D manager, could just as well be outsourced as one component of an 
external source. A supplier then handles and coordinates the flow from raw wood material to 
the delivery of the complete component. Company D’s objective is to find an external 
  
supplier with a process that is more competent than its current in-house production. However, 
finding highly reliable suppliers with developed capabilities, scale, and experience and that 
can handle outsourcing is challenging. Company D does not want 10 smaller suppliers 
because selecting few larger suppliers to handle most of the component manufacturing is 
more beneficial. By starting with the test outsourcing of M/B components and then gradually 
increasing volumes, Company D aims to evaluate suppliers’ competence and technology in 
handling the selected manufacturing of components. As one process manager stated: 
“…outsourcing that includes transferring competence always includes risks, 
and, therefore, it becomes important to weigh cost reduction possibilities 
and accompanied supply risks.” (Process manager)  
Case E – Outsourcing to measure and benchmark  
Company E is one of the largest wooden door manufacturers in Europe and one of the 
leading suppliers of internal and external door solutions in the Nordic region. During the 
1980s, the company supplied pinewood furniture to IKEA, and its highest priority was 
tracking costs related to this customer. The company has also retained such a focus on costs. 
Company E’s in-house production of wood components is more like a supply base that needs 
to be benchmarked with external sources and that ensures competitiveness in in-house 
production. The company aims for excellence in all processes and outsourcing has become a 
part of its overall strategy. Therefore, Company E uses a parallel production strategy to 
continuously benchmark productivity and ensure reversibility of the outsourcing decision 
(that is, maintaining buyer competence). This strategy also helps avoid the risk of 
unmotivated price increases attributable to high supplier dependency. Control over process 
costs is also the main reason why Company E decided to handle some simpler raw material 
processing plants within its boundary (for example, a sawmill in Estonia). As the group 
director explained: 
“Then the discussion about outsourcing or insourcing comes up, we are 
extremely focused on cost efficiency in our own plants … we must always be 
able to see how much this component costs in-house and what it costs 
externally.” (Group Director) 
The group director stated that the company prefers buying rather than making, and if a 
supplier can offer a price 20 percent lower than the own internal price, then the company 
considers either outsourcing or using the information as a benchmark to develop in-house 
processes. In other words, a continuous balance exists between focusing on outsourcing 
manufacturing activities and considering insourcing an already outsourced activity. The 
company is able to insource activities that are not cost-efficient enough.  
Typically, the company demands that suppliers have the scale to deliver to several plants. 
However, Company E does not view an underdeveloped supplier market as a hindrance 
because it takes a more proactive approach to developing its outsourcing partners. 
Competence is transferred to suppliers to streamline production processes and the flow of 
goods. In-house expert teams handle supplier development, which often includes helping 
suppliers with quality problems, building manufacturing experience, and resolving production 
problems or lack of reliability in their supplies. In addition, the team can help start up new 
technology and logistical methods, which the group director stated are the most difficult 
aspects to outsourcing. The teams reduced startup time after outsourcing was implemented 
and helped coordinate the flow between the supplier and Company E. Most importantly, these 
teams enabled to keep within the firm both buying and the competencies of wood component 
manufacturing.  
  
Discussion of findings 
To understand different types of mixed strategies and the position of such strategies along the 
continuum from insourcing to outsourcing, the discussion is structured around the types of 
mixed strategies represented by the cases. 
Outsourcing as a capacity regulator 
The “capacity regulator” case applies outsourcing as a complement to in-house 
manufacturing. A mixed strategy is applied to maintain flexibility and ensure high utilization 
of a company’s own production plants during fluctuating demand (see Table 5). This 
application is in line with the mixed strategy stream in the literature (e.g., Harrigan, 1986; 
Yang et al., 2005; He and Nickerson, 2006; Mols, 2010b) and moves most of the production 
in-house, also regarded by the case as the more important production resource.  
Arguably, a mixed strategy that divides volume between in-house and supplier production 
runs the risk of not finding full pooling effects; this notion is related to not being able to fully 
rationalize in-house production (e.g., Williamson, 1985). Previous writings on mixed 
strategies also argued that combining outsourcing with in-house production leads to higher 
costs (e.g., Mols, 2010b). However, our “capacity regulator” case illustrates that the cost 
driver must be evaluated with additional parameters. For this case, the external source could 
offer lower costs than in-house production. An outsourcing framework (e.g., Venkatesan, 
1992; Gottfredson et al., 2005) would prescribe the outsourcing of such activities. However, 
the case company decided to keep the majority of its production in-house. A key reason is that 
components considered for outsourcing are often the first input to the plants and critical to 
continue manufacturing. A lack of quality or delays in supply can become so costly that they 
render the cost reduction of the initial outsourcing quite small in comparison.  
From this viewpoint, a mixed strategy arguably saves total costs in the long run, whereas 
fully taking advantage of short-term economies of scale might not be possible. Therefore, a 
mismatch risk seems to exist in terms of what should be considered strategically important in 
a purely cost-based approach. A cost-based approach involves a heavy cost focus when 
formulating the risks of outsourcing strategies and disregards that components can be 
operation-critical and vulnerable to supplier failure. This notion aligns with several previous 
studies that identified a gap in the literature, and additional research is needed to bridge the 
gap between strategic and operational dimensions in outsourcing decisions (e.g., Boulaksil 
and Fransoo, 2010; Dekkers, 2011).  
Outsourcing of non-cost competitive production 
Much of the theoretical underpinnings of outsourcing rest on the assumption that a 
supplier market exists that can manage the activities considered for outsourcing, and that an 
actor in the market will always exist that is better suited to producing the outsourced activities 
(e.g., Williamson, 1985). However, the “outsource non-competitive production” case clearly 
illustrates the struggle to find developed suppliers and also the risk of lock-in. In this view, a 
mixed strategy has the potential to act as a safeguard to lower dependency risks in outsourcing 
and, thus, the risk of supplier opportunism (Williamson, 1985).  Therefore, if a non-developed 
supplier market exists (what Walker et al. (2005) also termed an imbalanced supply market), 
a mixed strategy becomes a way to maintain control of the development and market prices. 
From this view, the cost driver is also strongly linked to the “outsource non-competitive 
production” case, which has working in-house production that is cost-competitive as long as 
no larger investments are needed. Here, a mixed strategy is applied to improve the overall cost 
  
efficiency by outsourcing the least cost-competitive production lines. The case still considers 
in-house production as the most important production resource.  
Outsourcing to improve the structure of given capacity 
The need for capacity as a driver to apply a mixed strategy is most obvious in the 
“capacity regulator” case but can also be linked to the “internal structure” case from another 
viewpoint. Both case companies outsource to increase flexibility and avoid costly investments 
in in-house manufacturing (e.g., Quinn and Hilmer, 1994; Cánez et al., 2000). However, the 
cases are different in nature and resemble the two views that also exist in the literature. For 
the “internal structure” case, outsourcing is considered a means to manage an operational 
bottleneck by outsourcing the majority of certain production (see Table 5). This strategy is 
linked to managing the scarcity of manufacturing space, the resolution of which cannot 
always be fully justified by costly greenfield investments. This line of argument better follows 
the outsourcing stream in the literature (e.g., Harrison and Kelly, 1993; Fill and Visser, 2000).  
Outsourcing to build own experience 
The “develop capability” case is in an early-stage outsourcing phase with a focus on 
retaining competencies. The mixed strategy allows testing of performance uncertainty and 
helps develop the supplier (cf. Leenders and Nollet, 1984). Therefore, most of the production 
will initially be kept in-house, but the goal is to increase outsourcing as time goes on (during 
which time either supplier performance uncertainties are reduced or more suppliers are 
developed). Moreover, our “develop capability” case shows that a mixed strategy initially 
helps protect against lock-in risk, but the strategy is more the result of the company’s own 
lack of outsourcing experience. 
Outsourcing to measure and benchmark 
Similar to the “develop capability” case, some production is kept in-house in the 
“benchmark and develop supplier” case, which then maintains in-house complementary 
knowledge and competencies to support and develop suppliers. However, the manners in 
which outsourcing is applied compared with the “develop capability” case is very different. 
Whereas the “benchmark and develop suppliers” case uses in-house manufacturing as more of 
a complement to outsourcing, the “develop capability” case initially keeps the majority of 
production in-house (see Table 5). The concept applied by the “benchmark and develop 
supplier” case is closely related to the aim of continuous cost benchmarking and creating cost 
transparency. Here the aim is retaining a focus on price to avoid unmotivated increases. Thus, 
a cost driver is clearly obvious in the “benchmark and develop suppliers” case, which views 
both in-house production and the supplier as a supply base.  
In contrast to several other make and buy studies (e.g., Jakobides and Billinger, 2006; 
Puranam, 2008; Mols, 2010a), the “benchmark and develop” supplier case does not apply a 
mixed strategy to access competencies that would be difficult and costly to develop internally 
(e.g., Quinn, 2000). Instead, component production is kept in-house, which then keeps in-
house complementary knowledge and competencies to support and develop suppliers 
(“benchmark and develop suppliers” case). In this sense, the “benchmark and develop 
suppliers” case aligns well with studies that argued for a mixed strategy to transfer knowledge 
from in-house to external suppliers (e.g., Parmigiani and Mitchell, 2009; Mols, 2010b). Most 
production is outsourced, but the case description illustrates the need to keep in-house 
complementary competencies that are required to support the company’s core competencies. 
Previous studies found similarly that retaining such competencies in-house to ensure 
  
continuous competence development (for productivity gains, for example) can even outweigh 
the cost advantages from outsourcing (see Broedner et al., 2009). This finding adds to 
previous research findings on the advantages of a mixed strategy by illustrating that such a 
strategy facilitates not only access to external sources’ capabilities but also keeps a developed 
resource base in-house; that is, it increases the resource base (cf. Parmigiani, 2007; Mols, 
2010a).  
Different types of mixed strategies along the continuum from insourcing to outsourcing 
Based on the previous discussion, with a starting point as noted in Figure 1, the mixed 
strategies of the five case studies can be linked to the different identified drivers (see Table 5) 
and, thus, positioned between the two ends of the continuum (see Figure 4). 
 
Insert Table 5 here. 
 
The “benchmark and develop supplier” strategy quite clearly illustrates an outsourcing-
dominant strategy that uses a mixed strategy to measure the company’s own performance and 
supplier prices and costs. A key driver is for the company to continuously analyze its internal 
and external business processes to determine its competitiveness. In contrast, the “develop 
capability” strategy can be positioned as an in-house dominant strategy (see Figure 4) whose 
first step in an outsourcing program is to outsource some volumes to develop one’s own 
competencies (cf. Leenders and Nollet, 1984). Contemplating gradual outsourcing is viewed 
as a safeguard when uncertainty exists regarding the competencies and skills of suppliers.  
The three other mixed strategies can be positioned between the two ends of the continuum 
(see Figure 4). The “capacity regulator” strategy keeps the majority of production in-house 
and manages demand cyclicality by using outsourcing to ensure high capacity utilization of 
assets (that is, downward adjustment of outsourcing during times of market decline and 
increasing during demand peaks). The “outsourcing non-competitive production” strategy 
also keeps in-house the majority of production and focuses on cost efficiency of in-house 
production when combined with outsourcing. As previously shown, not all industrial 
contexts/settings developed suppliers with large-scale production systems (Walker et al., 
2005). Under such circumstances and for this case study, complete outsourcing to lower in-
house costs becomes more complicated, particularly if the in-house production is up and 
running with little need for new investments. However, large-scale production systems can 
involve some production lines or products that are more costly to operate or produce in-house 
but could be better managed through an outsourcing agreement and by this outsource non-
competitive production. The “internal structure” strategy highlights the use of in-house 
production parallel with outsourcing to reduce in-house complexity and the reallocation of 
operational resources. This case does not view the in-house production base for component 
manufacturing as a strategic resource. Instead, an outsourcing logic is more dominant and is 
needed to enable manufacturing of other products that are considered more important and that 
help create differentiation and value for customers.  
 
 
Insert Figure 4 here. 
 
 
  
Two points should be noted from this discussion. Firstly, similar to different contractual 
relationships (e.g., McIvor, 2008), companies are able to apply a large range of different 
possible mixed strategies. Secondly, all the cases studied illustrated how significant flexibility 
in the outsourcing decision can be created. With an in-house-dominant outsourcing strategy, 
flexibility refers to what the literature often terms volume flexibility (e.g., Salvador et al., 
2007; Jacobides and Billinger, 2006) and supply chain flexibility (e.g., Stevenson and Spring, 
2009; Fredriksson et al., 2010). With such a strategy, maintaining cost levels and managing 
the volume uncertainty that exists in the market can swiftly change output (Mols, 2010b). 
With an outsourcing-dominant strategy, flexibility refers more to keeping complementary 
competencies. However, at the same time, this concept arguably shows that flexibility means 
that finding the most optimal solution in each individual situation is not always possible. For 
example, from a TCE perspective, a mixed strategy may imply the risk of not finding full 
pooling effects, which is related to not being able to fully rationalize in-house production (i.e., 
dividing the volume between in-house and supplier production). Thus, in view of a TCE, 
parallel production should theoretically lead to higher costs (Williamson, 1985). At the same 
time, our “capacity regulator” strategy illustrates that full outsourcing might not be an 
appropriate strategy even if the external source offers lower costs. Instead, parallel in-house 
production works as a buffer to improve production flexibility and to avoid costly production 
interruptions. In this way, a mixed strategy has the potential to act as a safeguard to avoid one 
of the most argued dependency risks in TCE, namely small number bargaining and, thus, the 
risk of supplier opportunism (Williamson, 1985) and revenue appropriation (Walker, 1988). If 
one perceives that a non-developed supplier market exists – what Walker et al. (2005) also 
termed an imbalanced supply market – a mixed strategy is a way to maintain control over 
development and market prices. TCE effectively rests on the assumption that a supplier 
market exists that can manage the activities considered for outsourcing and that an actor in the 
market better suited to producing outsourced activities will always exist (e.g., Williamson, 
1979). Without such a market, the buyer is viewed as needing to help develop this market.  
Conclusions 
This paper’s investigation of mixed strategies is aligned with previous research (e.g., 
Jacobides and Billinger, 2006; Parmigiani, 2007; Mols 2010a; 2010b) to illustrate that such a 
strategy is a distinct choice that a firm makes and not merely an intermediate mode. Based on 
Leenders and Nollet (1984), a mixed strategy was further explored and contributed to by 
adding more depth to our understanding of different types of such strategies.  
By drawing on authors such as McIvor (2009) and Holcomb and Hitt (2007), from a TCE 
perspective, a mixed strategy is shown to save total costs in the long run, whereas being able 
to fully take advantage of short-term economies of scale might not be possible. Furthermore, a 
mixed strategy might help develop a well-functioning supplier market that prevents supplier 
opportunism and revenue appropriation. Thus, the buyer may need to adjust the TCE 
framework for its outsourcing decision to accommodate such a market. Similarly, from a RBT 
perspective, a mixed strategy arguably helps protect or even develops important resources that 
are not judged as strategically significant but that are critical for the operations. This argument 
adds to previous research findings on the advantages of a mixed strategy from a RBT 
perspective by illustrating that such a strategy also helps keep a developed resource base in-
house and does not only access external sources’ capabilities; in other words, a mixed strategy 
increases the resource base (cf. Parmigiani, 2007; Mols, 2010a). 
This paper posits that a variety of mixed strategies exist between the two governance 
forms of “make” or “buy.” In order to address how companies should think about how much 
  
to outsource (Harland et al., 2005), we structured this issue around two ends of a continuum: 
in-house dominance and outsourcing dominance. With in-house dominance, outsourcing is 
used as a function that is complementary and supportive to own in-house production to 
optimize the capacity utilization of the firm’s own plants, to outsource less cost-efficient 
production, or as a tool to learn how to outsource. When outsourcing dominates, in-house 
production complements external sourcing to maintain complementary competencies and 
avoid lock-in risk.  
Multiple studies addressed managing the balance between the in-house and outsourcing 
governance forms, often discussed as the risk of irreversibility (Lonsdale and Cox, 1997; 
Dekkers, 2011). However, more often than not, these studies centered their argument around 
different contractual forms and various relationship-building dimensions to avoid 
opportunism and competitive threats in the actual outsourcing agreement. For example, Quinn 
and Hilmer (1994) and McIvor (2009; 2011) suggested different types of contractual 
structures such as joint ventures to manage such opportunistic behavior. Tate and Ellram 
(2009) found that asset-specific investments and vendor training could reduce supplier-related 
risks. Gottfredson et al. (2005) suggested creating a new spin-off business when the 
outsourcing company has significant capability to perform the activity. Often neglected is the 
importance of keeping competencies and skills directly in-house, such as buying capabilities 
when buyer and seller mutually distrust one another, when relationships are managed at arms-
length, or in sectors with very limited supplier markets. 
For practitioners, this paper suggests that managers should think twice before rushing to 
implement a “me too” outsourcing strategy in which in-house capacities are completely 
closed (cf. Heriot and Kulkarni, 2001; Harland et al., 2005). Taking a dynamic view of 
outsourcing is important, considering the need for both flexibility (strategic and operational) 
and to keep complementary competencies in-house (cf. Boulaksil and Fransoo, 2010; 
Dekkers, 2011). In particular, this statement is true in situations with a non-developed 
supplier market in which the components considered for outsourcing are vulnerable to 
supplier failure or when a company has little outsourcing experience (cf. Walker et al., 2005). 
An option in such situations is a mixed strategy that retains some parallel in-house production 
and helps protect or even develops important resources that are not strategically significant 
but are critical for operations. Another option is a mixed strategy that keeps the majority of 
production in-house in order to balance demand peaks or to outsource non-standard 
production that does not complement large-scale, in-house production. Overall, applying a 
mixed strategy clearly enhances flexibility for managers contemplating outsourcing. 
However, it is important to recall that it is not always possible to have flexibility in terms of a 
mixed strategy means that finding the most optimal solution in each individual situation. 
The present study takes the first steps in exploring the variety of mixed strategies that 
exist on the continuum between insourcing and outsourcing. We hope that our work, in 
combination with prior work in the area, will generate more research on outsourcing that 
considers outsourcing decisions from a “make” or “buy” perspective and includes the 
different types of mixed strategies that exist in the grey zone in between. However, additional 
research is needed in this area. 
Other areas for further research include understanding the cost of mixed strategies and 
studying the supplier side. Little if any research has focused on mixed strategies from a 
supplier perspective. For example, if a customer retains its own in-house production, suppliers 
may be concerned that the customer is too short-sighted in its outsourcing. Such a mindset 
could cause the supplier to hesitate to fully invest in assets to take over the outsourcing, thus 
complicating outsourcing for the customer, which must be further addressed. Further research 
is also needed to investigate the costs of a mixed strategy (cf. Mols, 2010). A mixed strategy 
  
may be an interesting approach to handling supplier-related risks in outsourcing and enable 
process cost benchmarking, but how costly is it? Whereas cost reduction objectives continue 
to be the global key driving force for initializing outsourcing (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 
2005; Dekker, 2011), retaining production in-house over an extended period may be difficult 
to justify.  
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Table 1. Summary of recent outsourcing decision frameworks 
Author
s 
Year Stud
y 
Theoretical 
perspective 
Key points and outsourcing framework  
McIvo
r  
2010 Case RBT Constructs a 2x2 RBT matrix that analyzes 
capability (performance disparity and resources) 
and competitive contribution (value and imitability 
potential). Identifies RBT variables in outsourcing 
decisions, but RBT alone fails to explain 
opportunism. 
McIvo
r  
2011;
2009; 2008  
Case Integrating 
RBT & TCE 
States that both TCE and RBT are needed but 
can sometimes provide contradictory views. 
Proposes a three-dimensional framework – (1) 
contribution to competitiveness; (2) relative 
capability; (3) potential for opportunism – 
resulting in five sourcing strategies. Potential for 
opportunism managed by an appropriate 
relationship strategy (arms-length vs. relationship).  
Tate & 
Ellram  
2009 Case TCE Outlines a strategic framework for supplier 
selection and ongoing management for purchasing 
services from offshore suppliers. First step, linked 
to supplier selection, is defining sourcing 
opportunities and identifying the organization’s 
need for outsourcing. Next, in-house capabilities 
should be addressed. Finally, suitable suppliers 
should be located to start the negotiation and 
contract process.   
Holco
mb and Hitt 
2007 Case 
examples 
Integrating 
RBT & TCE 
Using cost motives (TCE) alone limits the 
analysis. The paper suggests a theoretical model 
for outsourcing in which TCE arguments are 
complemented by RBT in terms of gaining access 
to specialized capabilities, which should help firms 
ensure value beyond efficient cost mechanisms.   
Gottfre
dson et al. 
2005 Case 
examples 
RBT/ ERBT Outlines a three-step strategic outsourcing 
framework: (1) decide core vs. non-core functions 
based on proprietary asset and uniqueness; (2) 
cost/quality benchmark non-unique/proprietary 
functions to find best sourcing option; (3) decide 
on outsourcing items’ need for proximity.    
Aron 
& Singh 
2005 Case 
examples 
Influence of 
RBT / ERBT and 
TCE 
Define three-step framework: (1) identify core 
(keep in-house), critical (potential for outsource), 
and commodity (outsource) processes based on 
value creation vs. value capture; (2) use matrix to 
evaluate operational (supplier failure related) and 
structural (opportunism related) risks; (3) decide 
proximity (offshore vs. local) and organizational 
form. 
Baines 
et al. 
2005 Case 
studies 
Operationaliz
ation of earlier 
frameworks 
Develops and tests a more interlinked five-
stage decision process that guides manufacturers 
to a decision on their upstream and downstream 
strategic positioning. 
 
  
 
Table 2. Types of driver, descriptions of subsequent mixed strategies and sources. 
Type of 
driver 
Subsequent mixed strategy Source 
Capacity 
flexibility 
Balance in-house manufacturing 
capacity when demand varies and 
create effective capacity utilization. 
Mols (2010b); Jacobides and Billinger 
(2006); Yang et al. (2005); de Kok (2000); 
Kamien and Li (1990); Harrigan (1986). 
 Use multiple supply chains to 
match predictable vs. unpredictable 
demand (e.g., global vs. local 
sourcing). 
He and Nickerson (2006); Ferdows et al. 
(2004); Fredriksson et al. (2010). 
Core 
competence/ 
capabilities 
Access strong external 
competencies to develop in-house 
competencies and/or use strong 
internal capabilities to strengthen the 
capabilities of external suppliers.  
Mols (2010b); Puranam et al. (2008); 
Parmigiani and Mitchell (2009); Parmigiani 
(2007); Jacobides and Billinger (2006); 
Rothaermel et al. (2006); Veugelers and 
Cassiman (1999); Bradach and Eccles (1989); 
Leenders and Nollet (1984). 
Lock-in 
risks 
Lower barriers to exit and lock-in 
risks by keeping buying and 
manufacturing competencies in-house 
with a mixed strategy. 
Mols (2010a; 2010b); Puranam et al. 
(2008); Parmigiani (2007); Heide (2003); Dutta 
et al. (1995); Harrigan (1986). 
Cost Keep production in-house to 
benchmark the performance of 
external suppliers and create cost 
transparency and bargain power. 
Mols (2010a; 2010b); Puranam et al., 
(2008); Jacobides and Billinger (2006); Heide 
(2003). 
    
 
 
  
  
 
 
Table 3. Overview of cases studied and data collection methods. 
WPM case Company description Interviewees Secondary data  
Case A - 
Outsourcing as a 
capacity regulator 
Large European producer of 
wooden windows 
Group director, 
CEO, two production 
managers, project 
manager 
Annual reports, 
press releases, and 
presentation materials 
Case B - 
Outsourcing of non-
cost competitive 
production 
Large European wood 
flooring producer 
CEO and 
purchasing director 
Annual reports, 
press releases, and 
internal data (strategy 
documents and 
outsourcing calculation 
material) 
Case C - 
Outsourcing to 
improve the structure 
of given capacity 
Large supplier of wooden 
windows in the Nordic region 
Managing 
director, sales 
manager, purchasing 
manager  
Annual reports, 
press releases 
Case D - 
Outsourcing to build 
own experience 
Large European wood 
flooring producer 
R&D manager, 
process manager, and 
product manager 
Annual reports and 
environmental reports  
Annual reports and 
business strategy 
presentations 
Case E - 
Outsourcing to 
measure and 
benchmark 
Large supplier of wooden 
doors in the Nordic region 
Group director  Annual reports and 
internal data (business 
strategy presentations) 
 
 
  
 
Table 4. A typology of five different mixed strategies. 
Case Case A Case B Case C Case D Case E 
Descri
ption 
Capacity 
regulator 
Outsource 
non-competitive 
production 
Develop 
capability 
Internal 
structure 
Benchmark 
and develop 
suppliers 
Mixed 
strategy 
Ensure high-
capacity 
flexibility in 
demand 
variations. 
Outsource 
the least cost-
competitive 
production 
lines. 
Build 
experience 
before full-scale 
outsourcing. 
Make room 
for capacity 
expansion for 
other activities. 
Measure and 
benchmark own 
performance and 
supplier price/cost. 
Motiva
tion 
To avoid high 
fixed costs in-
house and to 
maintain high 
utilization of own 
assets. 
Own 
production is 
very cost-
efficient and 
has low fixed 
costs; no 
suppliers 
available.  
Minimal 
experience in 
outsourcing; 
few large-scale 
suppliers 
available. 
Plant size 
cannot be easily 
expanded; 
avoid costly 
investments in a 
new plant. 
In-house and 
external production 
is considered more 
as a supply base.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Table 5. Mixed strategies of the cases studied related to drivers of a mixed strategy. 
Case Case A Case B Case C Case D Case E 
Descript
ion 
Capacity 
regulator 
Outsource 
non-competitive 
production 
Develop 
capability 
Internal 
structure 
Benchmark 
and develop 
suppliers 
Capacity 
flexibility 
High 
importance: 
complementary 
outsourcing to 
manage volume 
uncertainty. 
High 
importance: 
complementary 
outsourcing to 
improve overall 
capacity 
efficiency. 
Low 
importance 
High 
importance: 
outsourcing to 
improve the 
structure of 
given in-house 
capacity/plant 
size. 
Low 
importance 
Core 
competence/ 
capabilities 
Low 
importance 
Low 
importance 
High 
importance: 
retaining 
competencies in 
early stage 
outsourcing. 
Low 
importance 
High 
importance: 
supporting and 
developing 
suppliers. 
Lock-in 
risks 
Low 
importance 
Low 
importance 
High 
importance: "test 
outsourcing” to 
build own 
capability. 
Low 
importance 
High 
importance: 
retain in-house 
production to 
avoid 
unmotivated 
increases. 
Costs 
 
Low 
importance 
High 
importance: 
improve overall 
cost efficiency 
by outsourcing 
non-cost-
competitive 
production lines. 
Low 
importance 
High 
importance: 
avoid costly in-
house 
investments. 
High 
importance: 
benchmark 
measure in-
house vs. 
external 
supplier.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 1. Drivers for a mixed strategy (adapted from Leenders and Nollet, 1984, p. 12). 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Theoretical frameworks for outsourcing.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Mixed strategies structured across a continuum.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Five different mixed strategies structured across a continuum between in-house production 
and outsourcing 
 
